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1 If anything is well-established in contemporary theory, it is the idea that humans are
essentially non-essential. In this sense, contemporary theory has pursued with particular
vigor the project of discrediting the classically (Aristotelian) humanist schema in which
humans are defined as rational animals by nature. In the wake of such work it is now a
commonplace that,  to  paraphrase Foucault,  the features  defining human life  are not
natural givens, but are themselves at stake in the historical and political activities of
human beings.1 Humans are understood today as irreducibly reflexive animals whose
very activity alters what it means to be human.
2 My intent in this paper2 is not to contest this conception of the human being, as it is one
of the profound consequences of coming to think of human life historically, which – in
turn – is one of the great achievements of modern thought. But, as I will argue here, there
are two ways of thinking about the historicity of human being. For reasons I will outline
below, I believe one of these ways is superior to the other. In fact, there is a danger
attending one form of historical thinking that manifests itself in contemporary strands of
philosophical  vitalism;  in  these  strands,  I  contend,  non-essentiality  is  itself
surreptitiously  converted  into  something  essential  through  its  articulation  as  an
ahistorical  property.  Against  this  position,  I  will  argue for  the importance of  Walter
Benjamin’s conception of historicity for contemporary theory and politics through what I
am going to call his image of ‘de-vitalized life’. Benjamin’s de-vitalized life presents an
image of life stripped of its properties. But the removal of these properties is not about
merely de-essentializing life; it is simultaneously the removal of properties in order to
foreground the necessity of history as the dimension or medium of human social and
political  constitution.  Accordingly,  de-vitalized  life  serves  as  a  reminder  of  the
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historically  destructive  reduction of  human life  and the  necessity  of  political  (class)
struggle. Benjamin’s image is therefore an index of the need for historical perception and
action as the very thing that clears the ground of all positive idols of human nature.
Benjamin manifests an acute awareness of  the fact  that the relation between human
being and human history is fragile,  in imminent jeopardy of being converted into an
ideology of movement toward an already established goal, an essence presupposed and
presented as though it were already accomplished. In contrast to this pre-suppositional
view, for Benjamin as for Marx, if it is not to become ideological, the human historical
essence must always be presented negatively.
 
I. An Essentialized Non-Essence 
3 To begin with, it is useful to outline further the parameters of the issue to which I will
argue Benjamin’s  thought  contributes.  The idea that  humans are above all  historical
beings, so that it is not possible to define them in terms of some given property, is mostly
uncontroversial  in contemporary theory.  The correlate to such a view is that human
beings must be defined negatively, i.e. as lacking an essence except where this is self-
created,  and  therefore  defined  by  no  extant  natural  property  that  is  not  subject  to
historical making. However, as Roberto Esposito has convincingly argued in Immunitas
(2002), there seems to be a discomfort with the negativity of this definition of the human.
In response to such discomfort, a philosophical anthropology has appeared, designed to
compensate  for  the  negative  by converting it  into a  positive  essence.3 In  this  sense,
Esposito argues, philosophical anthropology takes over the task once performed by divine
theodicy, providing humanity with an interpretative (and thus comforting) self-image. In
other words, if it is now impossible to define humanity as relative to the order of nature,
i.e. in terms of a statically ascribed property, then philosophical anthropology appears as
“the reinstatement of a shattered order”4 that ascribes to humanity a self-referentially
defining property. But as Esposito comments, compensation “brings with it a gain, but
never divorced from the loss that it is meant to reinstate”.5 This form of compensation is
never  entirely  satisfactory  because  it  always  refers  back  to  the  lack  that  made  it
necessary in the first place.
4 At this point it is possible to bring Esposito’s discussion of philosophical anthropology to
bear  on  the  relation  between  contemporary  theory  and  politics.  In  this  respect,  as
Lorenzo Chiesa has argued provocatively, contemporary variants of ontological vitalism –
despite the many differences between them – share the common feature of converting
human  non-essence  into  a  positive  property  that  overlaps  with  a  new  type  of
philosophical anthropology.6 According to his analysis, in contemporary theory one finds
a  move  to  define  the  human not  by  specific  attributes,  but  by  positively  construed
ontological  capacities,  each  of  which  is  carefully  portrayed  negatively  relative  to  the
metaphysical  tradition  of  classical  humanism.  Here  one  could  mention  Catherine
Malabou’s notion of plasticity7 as it appears in her work on neuroplasticity, as well as in
her work on Hegel.8 One could also mention Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri’s notion of
a  constitutive  power in  the form of  a  multitude which undermines  the impositions  of
capitalist biopolitics – a point to which I will  return below.9 One could even mention
Roberto Esposito’s own conception of an affirmative biopolitics, which, he suggests, could
serve as an antidote to an ascendant biopolitics of immunity.10 In all these cases, one finds
both the denial of human essence and a conversion of this denial into a new kind of quasi-
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essence – a non-property reconfigured as a generic capacity, which (because it defines the
human as such), subsumes the specific conditions of humanity’s historical and political
form. The overall problem with such post-metaphysical anthropology, in sum, is that it
rushes to fill  in the gap of non-essential negativity with a positive principle,  albeit a
dynamic and non-substantive one. At the same time, its political problem seems to be the
substitution of a dynamic of history with a semi-naturalistic becoming.
5 A brief examination of Hardt and Negri’s concept of the multitude allows this problem of
philosophical anthropology to be grasped more exactly. According to Hardt and Negri,
the  multitude,  which  they  argue  is  capable  of  resisting  and  overturning  capitalist
globalization, must be thought on two distinct planes: on the first, the multitude exists as
a purely constitutive power,  a power of abstract potentiality,  while on the second, it
exists as contingent historical actualization. However, these “two multitudes”, they write,
cannot really be separated, since if “the multitude were not already latent and implicit in
our social being, we could not even imagine it as a political project; and, similarly, we can
only hope to realize it today because it already exists as a real potential”.11 The theory of
the  multitude is  one in  which there  are  two dimensions  of  the  multitude as  a  vital
constituent power, one an abstract potential and the other an historical actualization,
comprising what they describe as “a strange double temporality: always already and not-
yet”.12 Drawing on Spinoza, they argue that the multitude in this first sense exists sub
specie aeternitatis, and this is what lends to the multitude the sense of existing in the form
of an “always-already”.13
6 In his incisive critique of Hardt and Negri, Benjamin Noys argues that the concept of the
multitude presents an image of a fully developed human essence latent in that part of the
multitude  that  they  term  “always  already”.14 The  problematic  consequence  of  this
presupposition, as Noys elaborates, is that present conditions that appear to block the full
realization of the multitude become the latter’s self-imposed limitations; as Noys writes,
the “‘relation’ of two powers is actually a singular nexus in which life as constituent
power  faces  constituted  ‘power’  as  the  negative  limit  which  it  has  produced”.15 If
everything is the result of the boundless productivity and constitutive capacity of the
multitude, then even what impedes it must be nothing more than its own product at a
given historical moment. The political consequence of this notion of the multitude is, as
Noys elaborates,
that ‘capitalist relations’ figure only as the self-imposed limit of the multitude to its
own  powers:  they  are  its  own  powers.  The  collapse  of  negativity into  [the]
reversible moment of re-valorisation leaves us at risk of a monism of positivity, in
which, despite all the evidence, capital is the mere expression of the underlying
power of the multitude.16
7 What Noys’ criticism demonstrates is that in this model of non-essentiality, history is
placed in a subordinate position with respect to an ontological principle – in this case the
living vitality of the multitude – that is presupposed relative to it. Although this vital
principle, formally speaking, has no substantive content, and therefore qualifies as non-
essential  according  to  the  terms  of  classical  humanism,  the  principle  nevertheless
surreptitiously provides a content – namely, an abstract image of fully realized human
life – that it falls to subsequent historical (social and political) activity to substantialize.
But  if  history  already  has  its  work  cut  out  for  it,  if  its  task  is  primarily  to  realize
something pre-given – regardless of how abstract it might be – we cannot truly think
history itself as the pure medium of human self-creation, since this medium finds itself
already in the debt of something prior which is conceived non-historically, as history’s
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other or outside. In other words, Hardt and Negri cannot adequately support their claim
that because the multitude does not have a substantive content,  it  is therefore not a
teleological concept. If we concede this point, then Chiesa is quite correct to charge this
strand of ontological vitalism with producing what Esposito has called a compensatory
philosophical  anthropology  in  the  aftermath  of  classically  humanist  (substantive)
definitions of human nature. In the next section I will draw on a reading of early Marx
that avoids this implicit re-essentialization, despite the fact that the young Marx is often
read precisely in this essentializing way. 
 
II. Early Marx
8 Ironically,  even though Hardt  and Negri  draw extensively  on Deleuze and Spinoza –
thinkers who are deeply hostile to classical humanism – their work on the multitude
parallels the humanist reading of early Marx. According to such a reading, what makes
the  early  Marx  into  a  humanist  is  that  he  conceives  of  revolutionary  politics  as  a
necessary step for the realization of Gattungswesen (‘species-essence’, or human nature).
As Frank Ruda points out in a recent paper that presents a Badiouian take on Marx’s early
writings, the humanist reading, much like Hardt and Negri’s multitude, “conceives of
Marx as the theoretician of the sublation of alienation – a theorist of Ent-Entfremdung –
which can be achieved because the constitution and disposition of human nature […]
contains  all  the  resources  and  possibilities  which  are  needed”17 to  overcome  the
alienation of  the capitalist  mode of  production.  While the early humanist  Marx thus
rejects a classically substantive determination of human nature, he nonetheless posits,
according to Ruda, “a more general, historically-philosophically, and finally ontologically,
secured machinery”18 for the historical realization of the species.
9 Nevertheless, as Ruda goes on to argue, it is possible to read the early Marx in a non-
humanist way.19 Doing so involves paying attention to Marx’s emphasis on history as the
medium through which humanity brings itself  into existence,  and thus displaces the
humanist  presupposition of  a substantive human essence.  This non-humanist  reading
comes into focus when one considers the manner in which it foregrounds certain aspects
of Marx’s thought, as – for example – in the following passage from the Economic and
Philosophical Manuscripts (1844): “Nature as it comes into being in human history – in the
act of creation of human society – is the true nature of man; hence nature as it comes into
being through industry, though in an estranged form, is true anthropological nature”.20 In
this passage, a non-humanist reading would emphasize that estrangement is subordinate
to the historical action of human self-creation. Estrangement is not the correlate of a true
human nature existing already ‘offstage’, but rather, points toward the possibility that
humans might grasp their own historical self-creation as their very species-nature. 
10 It  is  precisely the question of  actualizing the productive historicity of  human beings
which makes the working class/proletariat distinction of crucial importance in Marx’s
work. That is,  it is only in the process of transforming itself from working class into
proletariat  (i.e.  in  actual  historical  activity)  that  humanity  grasps  its  essence  as  a
historically self-creating species-being.  In order for this to occur,  Marx argues,  there
must exist as its precondition a class of society that is both productive of that society and
simultaneously excluded from the determinate categories of membership in that society.
This is  what the working class is,  since the immiserated class of  bourgeois/capitalist
society is not able to partake of the riches that their labour has made possible, nor can it
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claim membership in humanity as conceived by the bourgeoisie. The latter, by contrast, is
a ‘proper’ class, precisely because it realizes a particular (static) image of humanity as a
species of aquisative individuals. As such, however, it is finite and limited, since its image
of humanity is mistaken for humanity as such, yet tied to a particular form of social
production, namely that of private property and capital accumulation. The working class,
on the other hand, in being excluded from this particular form of humanity, is capable –
from out of the historical circumstances in which it finds itself – of self-cognition as a
thoroughly historical class that is capable of universal human production. In other words,
the working class contains the germ of a different relationship of humanity to itself,
insofar as it recognizes itself not just as an impoverished, excluded, or exploited class (the
way it appears in capitalism), but as no class at all, that is, as universal humanity in the
generic and negative form of its exclusion from particular (bourgeois) humanity. Only in
this universal form can the working class as proletariat then recognize that its historical
production is the production of humanity as such, so that its production is able to become
the  self-aware,  universal  production  of  humanity.21 In  the  section  below,  I  turn  to
Benjamin’s work, arguing that his understanding of historical time, examined through
the aforementioned concept of ‘devitalized life’, develops the non-humanist idea of self-
creation we have been exploring via early Marx.
 
III. Benjamin and de-vitalized life
11 It is remarkable that we find, in Benjamin’s work, a critique of humanist readings of the
early Marx on the one hand, and, on the other, a compelling expansion of the concept of
historicity that the non-humanist reading of early Marx presupposes. As I will show in
the following, Benjamin’s concept of historicity, which is focused on the political figure of
‘de-vitalized life’, presents an alternative model of non-essentiality that allows history to
emerge as the pure medium of human self-production; in marked contrast to a vitalist
ontology of life, Benjamin’s ‘de-vitalized life’ remains resolutely negative with respect to
all substantive determinations of human being.
12 Accordingly,  it  is  striking  how Benjamin poses  the  problem of  the  gap between the
oppressed working class and the revolutionary proletariat in his theses “On the Concept
of History” (1940). In Thesis XII he writes, “[t]he Social Democrats preferred to cast the
working class in the role of a redeemer of future generations […]. This indoctrination
made the working class forget both its hatred and its spirit of sacrifice,  for both are
nourished  by  the  image  of  enslaved  ancestors  rather  than  by  the  ideal  of  liberated
grandchildren”.22 Benjamin argues here that the political strength of the working class,
which might serve to transform it into the proletariat, lies in a remembrance of what I am
calling ‘de-vitalized life’, that is, an image of ancestors (or predecessors) deprived of a
fully human life, rather than of future generations who will enjoy it. What is striking
about the image of de-vitalized life is that it is so resolutely negative. The image refuses
the utopian promises  offered by the social  democrats  of  Benjamin’s  day and instead
arouses,  as he puts it,  “hatred” and a “spirit of sacrifice”23 in the working class.  The
transition from working class to proletariat is not pictured as the progressive unfolding
of  something  already  promised  –  liberated  grandchildren whose  lives  will  enjoy  full
human vitality – but instead involves the deepening of opposition to the existing order,
strengthening the proletarian resolve to abolish (negate) capitalist society. It would be
tempting at this point to draw a parallel between the social democrats of Benjamin’s day
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and the current crop of neo-vitalists.  But rather than developing this thought,  I  will
expand instead  on  the  link  that  Benjamin establishes  between the  negativity  of  de-
vitalized life and his concept of historical time, for it is this which gives weight to the
former.
13 As Benjamin writes elsewhere in “On the Concept of History”, “our coming was expected
on earth. Then like every generation that preceded us, we have been endowed with a weak
messianic power, a power on which the past has a claim”.24 This passage engages in an
apparent reversal of perspective when compared to the one previously cited. If previously
Benjamin emphasized a political remembrance of the de-vitalized lives of the past by
proletarian subjects of the present, he now suggests that the de-vitalized lives of the past
have a claim on those who come after them. But how can those who are already dead be
said to retain a claim on the present, and what sort of a claim could it be? If the force of
remembrance lies with the past’s expectations or even anticipations of the present, then
this suggests that something more than the empirical memories of the historical heirs is
at play here.
14 To get at what sort of claim the past has on the present for Benjamin, it is instructive to
consider his essay of  1923,  “The Task of  the Translator”.  Herein we find a theory of
translation,  articulated as  a  force of  transposition,  which sheds light  on the relation
between generations that I intimated above. According to Benjamin, translation is first of
all a question of linguistic communicability or impartibility (Mitteilbarkeit) before it is a
question of the content communicated or transmitted. This is why Benjamin states that
neither the original texts, nor their translations, exist for the sake of their recipients, but
just the opposite:  the recipient is only a party to “meaningful” communication in an
indirect way, as the contingent addressee of imparting itself. As Benjamin writes, “[t]he
question of whether a work is translatable has a dual meaning. Either: Will an adequate
translator ever be found among the totality of its readers? Or, more pertinently: does its
nature lend itself to translation and, therefore, in view of the significance of this form,
call for it?”25 Benjamin answers his question by claiming that, while the answer to the
first question can only be an empirical one, the answer to the second must be answered
“apodictically”, that is, a priori.26
15 In the context of making his transcendental point about language, Benjamin provides an
analogy that seems to portend his future discussion of remembrance of ‘devitalized lives’
in 1940. He writes: “[o]ne might, for example, speak of an unforgettable life or moment
even if all men had forgotten it. If the nature of such a life or moment required that it be
unforgotten, that predicate would imply not a falsehood but merely a claim unfulfilled by
men.”27 In  an  obviously  Kantian  sense,  this  parallel  between  translation  and
remembrance places the latter on the same ‘transcendental terrain’ as translation itself,
thus  foreshadowing  Benjamin’s  subsequent  work  on  history  and  remembrance.  As
Werner Hamacher comments in his kaleidoscopic reading of Benjamin’s translation essay,
“translatability and unforgettability are essential predicates of a language or a life, in
principle  indifferent  to  the  capacities  of  any  given subject  to  fulfill  them”.28 As  the
transcendental condition for any possible translation, the demand for translatability and
remembrance  outstrips  the  empirical  “horizon  of  finite  experience”  even  while
remaining “operative within this horizon as calls back to the ground of experience itself,
to a realm of speech and action ecstatically removed from understanding as a structure of
judgment  and  correspondence”.29 Thus,  language  remains  translatable  and  memory
remains memorable,  even in the absence of the finite capacities of  particular human
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subjects, even if in empirical terms they cannot be translated or remembered. If this is
indeed the case, then neither translatability nor memorability consist principally in the
transmission of contents or memories (i.e.  of  subjective experiences) between subjects
through  time,  but  rather  in  a  transcendental  demand for  translation  and  for
remembrance. Here, the very impartibility (Mitteilbarkeit) of works (and, by extension,
lives) constitutes the demand of and for translation and memory, even if – at the level of
empirical experience – the work goes untranslated and the life remains unremembered.
16 It would be possible to go further in this direction and to suggest that, for Benjamin,
history  itself  is  the  medium of  this  demand,  that  history  is  nothing  other  than the
impartibility (Mitteilbarkeit) – the medium of the demand for remembrance – of works and
lives.  This  would  mean  that  the  essence of  such  mediality  is  to  exceed  all  possible
(empirical) reception, translation or remembrance, even as it makes it possible.30 Thus, as
Hamacher  writes,  if  “something’s  essence defines  it”  as  possible,  then  this  same
essentiality “indefines it and infinitizes it – as a demand infinitely in excess of every
propositional  actuality”.31 This  being-infinitely-in-excess  produces,  equally,  “the
possibility of – and demand for – an impossibility of translation, the possibility of – and
demand for – untranslatability”.32 If the translatability of language is the precondition
(medium) of all communication, and history is the condition of all remembrance, then it
is also possible that language will not be translated and lives will be forgotten.
17 What Hamacher calls the infinite demand for translation is fundamentally connected to
what Benjamin describes as the Überleben or ‘outliving’, and the Nachleben or afterlife, of
works and indeed of lives. If the essence of language is translation and that of history is
memorability, then language and memory are already beyond themselves, never confined
to a single work or life. Thus the essence cannot be thought of as something discreet –
bound to  an abstract  linear  point  in  time –  but  only  as  inherently  in-finitized,  self-
abandoned, because it is self-transmuting and transmitting. Such outliving-afterlife is not
to be confused with a hyper-vitality that allows works and lives to somehow escape their
destruction and death,  but  rather  precisely  the  opposite:  their  perishing is  the  very
hallmark of their essentially being-beyond-themselves, and it is this feature that makes
them translatable and memorable. Because of this we might say that remembrance is
integrally  related  to  translation.  If  the  essence  of  language  is  translation,  (i.e.
transposition and non-coincidence), then in remembrance (which requires the medium of
language)  lives  lost  are re-membered or re-composed,  leaping across  their  own non-
coincidence or lack and taking on a different, unpredictable, but relational existence, for
later generations.
18 If  this  is  accurate,  then remembrance  also  configures  historical  temporality  in  what
Benjamin  later  calls  a  constellation.  In  this  sense,  the  afterlife  of  language  and  the
afterlife  of  lives  can  be  articulated  in  terms  of  Benjamin’s  famous  depiction  of  the
dialectical  image,  in  the Passagen-Werk,  as  the relational  disconnection (the apparent
oxymoron is deliberate) of then and now. As Benjamin writes: “[i]t is not that what is past
casts its light on what is present, or what is present its light on what is past; rather, image
is  that  wherein  what  has  been  comes  together  in  a  flash  with  the  now  to  form  a
constellation”.33 Either  of  the  first  two alternatives  would be  but  another  version of
historicism, an attempt to think both past and present in a linear and causal way. But it is
against  just  this  linear  image of  historical  remembrance  that  Benjamin portrays  the
relation between past and present generations in the theses “On the Concept of History”
as a “weak messianic power”.34
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19 Thus,  as  Benjamin stipulates  in  the  passage  cited  above,  such a  messianic  power  of
remembrance is a weak power. The weakness here does not imply a lesser capacity or a
power of reduced degree, but as we can now see, a factor of contingency. Benjaminian
remembrance is not merely a counter-history, a history told from the perspective of the
oppressed and downtrodden that  would simply reverse the historical  position of  the
victors. The specific power of ‘blasting’ that removes lives from the continuum of history
that  seemed to  make their  fate  inevitable  supplies  much more than a  merely  linear
narrative,  no  matter  how unflattering  to  the  ruling  class;  it  also  carries  with  it  an
affective,  transitive  charge,  which  disrupts  and  interrupts  the  self-assured  way  of
understanding the course of time. However, like all such charges, it is unpredictable and
can “flash up” only at that precisely “dangerous” moment when it is capable of being
recognized by those in the present.35 But even though Benjamin writes in the Passagen-
Werk that “each ‘now’ is the now of a particular recognizability”, 36 this is far from a
prediction that explosive remembrance will result in the necessary political action. In
fact, as we have seen, such contingency seems to be demanded by the very messianic
structure  of  remembrance  itself.  If  remembrance  and  translation  share  the  same
underlying structure, partake of the same demand that structures historical time, then
remembrance cannot be thought to directly grasp messianic  time as  such.  Indeed,  if
messianic  time  is  just  this  transcendentally  medial  demand  of  impartibility,  as
temporalization,  then the latter provides merely the occasion or site (the demand of
imparting), but never the guarantee, of messianic remembrance. 
20 To take this last point a little bit further, the explosive remembrance that potentially
leads  to  political  revolution  is  clearly  distinguished  by  Benjamin  from  any  kind  of
messianic  presence  or  realization  of  a  messianic  state  or  condition.  This  is  perhaps
another sense in which we can speak of a ‘de-vitalized life’: empirical remembrance, even
if it issues in revolutionary politics, must be distinguished sharply from the messiah as a
figure of  secular eschatology.  To dispel  this potential  confusion,  it  will  be enough to
compare two of Benjamin’s texts that get at this point. In his preparatory notes for the
theses “On the Concept of History”, the so-called “Paralipomena”, Benjamin maintains
that  “[w]hoever  wishes  to  know  what  the  situation  of  ‘redeemed  humanity’  might
actually be, what conditions are required for the development of such a situation, and
when this development can be expected to occur, poses [a] question[s] to which there are
no answers”.37 This statement corresponds to another formulation in an earlier text, the
“Theological-Political  Fragment”  (c.  1921),  where  Benjamin  expresses  a  very  similar
sentiment with respect to the messiah. There he writes that “nothing that is historical
can relate itself, from its own ground, to anything messianic”.38 Benjamin’s theological
language in this early text, which nonetheless parallels the political language he uses in
the later “Paralipomena”, equally maintains that the Kingdom of God “is not the telos of
the historical dynamic; it cannot be established as a goal”.39 In both texts Benjamin insists
that it is never a question of ending historical time by bringing about a utopian (timeless)
condition.  This  is  the case not  only because a  future order of  universal  humanity is
unknowable in present circumstances, but more importantly, because messianic time is
vulgarized if it is thought to be a mere moment on the time-line of the present order.
Such  a  conception  fails  to  understand  that  messianic  time  is  not  on  the  order  of
sequential becoming, and is in this sense not something realizable; rather, such time is
fundamentally ‘untimely’  because it  never appears as the result of a causal historical
sequence.  In this  regard,  the image of  future society in Benjamin’s  work relentlessly
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cleaves to the negative image of the future. Consistent with this insight, ‘de-vitalized life’,
despite  its  brief  appearance  in  Benjamin’s  theses,  is  not  an  image  of  a  better  or
‘redeemed’ humanity corresponding to a messiah who has arrived, or whose coming is
promised.  Instead of  this,  in contrast  to the promissory images of  vitalized life,  ‘de-




21 What we have just been considering throws into relief one of the main issues dividing
vitalist-inspired philosophies from Benjamin’s image of de-vitalized life and his concept
of messianic history. The first,  as we saw in the case of Negri,  thinks the moment of
revolution or politics in terms of a constituent power that is already behind the scenes
and simply has to appear. It is thus a model of self-realization or actualization out of self-
alienation, not unlike the humanist reading of early Marx. In contrast to this, as Benjamin
–  and  indeed  the  anti-humanist  version  of  early  Marx  –  insists,  history  must  be
understood  as  the  creatio  ex  nihilo that  produces  the  not-yet  from  what  has  so  far
transpired. There is something discomfiting about this conception, since it takes away
any promises that such a transformation will occur; contingency rather than certainty
becomes the driving force of historical representation. Rather than the thinker of
‘mystical’ compensations, which he is sometimes portrayed as providing, Benjamin makes
political disappointment into a transcendental possibility. In this sense, the image of de-
vitalized  life  is  useful  as  a  counter-image  to  the  various  vitalist  concepts  of  super-
abundant  life.  In  contrast  to  these,  Benjamin  notes  in  his  “Theological-Political
Fragment” that “nature is Messianic by reason of its eternal and total passing away”.40
This  passage  suggests  that  it  is  precisely  because  the  messianic  moment  includes
historical destruction (negation) that it is not only the opposite of temporal passing away.
The passing away that we can locate in de-vitalized life is not just the sheer reduction or
negation of life, but the transience of the living that is related, through passing away, to
the weak messianic power of historical time, and through it, to the infinitizing demand
for transformation. Such transformation is never certain because Benjamin introduces a
gap between the  course  of  profane history  and messianic  time,  even as  he  seeks  to
articulate  their  connection.  It  is  in  this  uncertain  movement  of  displacement  and
connection,  whose  motion  must  be  traversed  negatively  and  without  promises,  that
human species-essence is recognizable as what it is: as fully historical life. 
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ABSTRACTS
This paper contends that Walter Benjamin’s image of life as ‘de-vitalized’ allows history to be
thought negatively, as open and without promises or guarantees. This negative conception of
history provides a valuable counterpoint to the prevalent variants of neo-vitalist thought that
continue to think human being in terms of an abstract (vital) property to be realized historically.
By refusing an image of  redeemed humanity,  Benjamin,  like  the early  Marx,  shows that  the
concept of history is necessary for thinking humanity non-essentially, and that, if it is to avoid
becoming an abstract essence, historical time must be thought negatively. 
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